!FREE E-PUB ☪ From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief ♆ PDF or E-pub free

!FREE E-PUB ♫ From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief ☨ The average person has a rich belief system about the thoughts and motives of people From antiquity to the beginning of this century, Stephen Stich points out, this folk psychology was employed in such systematic psychology as there was Those who theorized about the mind shared the bulk of their terminology and their conceptual apparatus with poets, critics, historians, economists, and indeed with their own grandmothersIn this book, Stich puts forth the radical thesis that the notions of believing, desiring, thinking, prefering, feeling, imagining, fearing, remembering and many other common sense concepts that comprise the folk psychological foundations of cognitive psychology should not and do not play a significant role in the scientific study of the mind The view endorsed is passe, but there are some good arguments that cognitive science should not concern itself with semantic content I was primarily interested in the conditions which Stitch thought belief would or would not be genuinely countenanced by cog sci He recants his main thesis in the first chapter of Deconstructing the Mind. ok I read the last couple of chapters in this today in the Library of Congress Stich argues that ordinary, folk psychological concepts of belief, desire, etc are pretty far removed from what goes by the name of belief and desire in cognitive science He tentatively suggests that there can be a reconciliation of ordinary discourse about mental states and cognitive science, that the two are not in competition in a kind of manifest image scientific image relation to one another He calls thi I read the last couple of chapters in this today in the Library of Congress Stich argues that ordinary, folk psychological concepts of belief, desire, etc are pretty far removed from what goes by the name of belief and desire in cognitive science He tentatively suggests that there can be a reconciliation of ordinary discourse about mental states and cognitive science, that the two are not in competition in a kind of manifest image scientific image relation to one another He calls this a Panglossian view, and argues that it rests on some empirical assumptions that might very well turn out to be false one of the assumptions is that there is some correspondence between ordinary mental concepts and the concepts employed by folk psychology if it turns out that on our best scientific understanding of the mind there is nothing that corresponds even roughly to belief, then we may have to give up on folk psychology I was interested in Stich s position because Chomsky cites it repeatedly, as an example of the kind of attitude that one ought to have about the relation between ordinary language and the language of science It turns out that Stich has a kind of contextualist view about belief, according to which there is no property picked out by believes that p , because what counts as belief is context dependent, but there are true utterances of S believes that p Interesting